"It is elementary that States are free to provide greater protections . . . than the Federal Constitution requires," California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1013Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, -14 (1983, and the same goes for Congress, so far as it operates within its constitutional powers.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Roberts Supreme Court, described as "the most conservative court since the mid-1930s," 1 has curtailed a number of constitutional freedoms. 2 But those favoring extensive constitutional rights could find solace in a cardinal principle of constitutional law: judicial interpretations of federal civil rights are only the floor for such protections, not the ceiling. The Federal Constitution provides the minimum standard for civil liberties in America, and Congress or the States can always go beyond these minimum standards and provide greater protections. As the Supreme Court put it, "[i]t is elementary that States are free to provide greater protections . . . than the Federal Constitution requires"-and, in principle, the same holds for Congress as well. 3 Thus if the Supreme Court refuses to grant criminal defendants a right of access to DNA evidence, or to protect the equal rights of homosexuals, or to mandate equal schooling opportunities for African American kids, that may be unfortunateso goes the argument-but Congress or the States can always step in and provide such remedies.
Indeed this possibility is often mentioned by the Supreme Court itself when it rejects claims of constitutional protections. 3. California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1013-14 (1983). As mentioned below, Congress is more limited than the States in its ability to enact civil liberties protections because it must act pursuant to its enumerated powers and because of issues of state sovereign immunity. See infra and notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
4. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (refusing to recognize the right of the terminally ill to physician-assisted suicide partly because " [b] y extending constitutional protection to an asserted right or liberty interest, we, to a great extent, place the matter outside the arena of public debate and legislative That the Federal Constitution provides only the national minimum follows directly from the text and the purpose of civil rights provisions.
The First Amendment, for example, reads: "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech." 5 Naturally, it would make little sense to read that Amendment as setting a limit on Congress' ability to protect free expression. So while the Supreme Court determined that the First Amendment does not protect sexually obscene speech, Congress or the States are perfectly free to provide such protections. 6 And while penalizing underage sex with girls more severely than underage sex with boys is not a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, nothing in that constitutional provision prevents a state from forbidding such unequal treatment. 7 Indeed many of the civil rights enjoyed by Americans are protected by statutes (both federal and state) and by state constitutions. 8 And though the federal government may be hampered in its ability to expand civil liberties by its limited constitutional powers 9 and by States' sovereign immunity, 10 the States may expand civil liberties as they see fit. 11 But the ability of Congress or the States to expand civil liberties has its limitations: sometimes the Federal Constitution is not just a floor for civil rights but also a ceiling. This happens whenever civil rights conflict-which may occur between different provisions of the Federal Constitution, as well as between the Federal Constitution and state constitutions or statutes. As a consequence, such conflicts constitute a particularly troublesome form of judicial review, because they may limit the ability of the democratic process to produce civil freedoms. 12 action").
5 11. I put aside the issue of federal statutes that restrict civil liberties-like federal statutes that limit the ability of states to decriminalize medical marijuana or allow for a right of assisted suicide for the terminally ill. My concern here is, first and foremost, with limitations on civil liberties imposed by judicial interpretations of the Federal Constitution.
12. See infra Part III.
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The conflicts this Article examines include some rights that are guaranteed not only vis-à-vis the government but also vis-à-vis some private entities of a public nature (such as shopping malls or the Boy Scouts of America). After all, there is nothing in the nature of civil rights that makes them susceptible to infringement only by government. The freedom of speech or religion, or the freedom from racial or gender discrimination, can certainly be impinged by private actors as well, which is why the constitutions of various countries and of a number of American states 13 do not contain a state action requirement in regard to certain civil liberties. 14 Moreover, the civil rights provisions of the Federal Constitution also regulate some private action: not only because the state action doctrine allows some private action to be considered government action, or because the Thirteenth Amendment contains no state action limitation but also because all state and federal laws that regulate private action, including common law rules, are subjected to federal constitutional standards.
It is thus that the First Amendment applies to defamation actions between private parties, 15 and that the Equal Protection Clause applies to certain private contractual disputes. 16 In short, there is no good analytical reason to exclude all the protections from private action from our definition of civil liberties.
Admittedly, once we allow the idea of civil rights to include guarantees against private parties, the potential for conflicts among civil rights grows exponentially: after all, whenever a civil right 13 provision is applicable to a private actor, that actor suffers, by definition, some government limitation on her freedom of action; and such limitation may very well conflict with another constitutional guarantee. However, my references to civil rights that are applicable to private actors are few and of a very conservative nature. In truth, there are more than enough conflicts among protections from the government itself.
The Article progresses in the following way: Section II(A) provides examples of potential conflicts between civil rights; Section II(B) provides examples of potential conflicts within civil rights; Section III examines the thesis of the incommensurability of fundamental rights and its possible implications to conflicts of rights; and Section IV offers concluding remarks.
II. CONFLICTS OF RIGHTS

A. Conflicts Between Rights
Property Rights Versus Free Speech
One famous alleged conflict between constitutional rights arose in PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, where the California Constitution's free speech protections were challenged as a violation of the Federal Constitution. 17 Four years earlier, the U.S. Supreme Court decided that the First Amendment was not applicable to privately-owned shopping malls. 18 When political protestors were subsequently ejected from a private shopping mall in Campbell, California, the California Supreme Court held that the ejection, although not in violation of the Federal Constitution, did violate the free speech provision of California's constitution. 19 The State of California, noted the court, was free to "provid[e] greater protection than the [Federal Constitution] seems to provide." 20 In response, the aggrieved shopping mall owner filed a lawsuit in federal court, arguing, inter alia, that California's constitution violated his constitutionally protected property rights. 21 Forbidding a private shopping mall owner to exclude political protestors from his property, said the complaint, amounted to a taking without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. The U.S. Supreme Court rejected the claim, but here was a case where the Federal Constitution could have limited the ability of a state to provide more freedom of speech to its residents. 23 And while the constitutional conflict was the very heart of the PruneYard case, in most cases the conflict is a mere sideshow in a larger battlewhich explains why many such conflicts do not receive the serious consideration they merit.
Equal Protection Versus Free Exercise
In 1972 Congress amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 so as to provide an exemption from antidiscrimination statutes for religious organizations engaged in employment discrimination on the basis of religion. 24 In Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed the case of a building custodian, who was fired from a job he had held for sixteen years on the ground that he was not a member of the Mormon Church. 25 The custodian sued, claiming unlawful discrimination on the basis of religion, and the Mormon Church responded by relying on the statutory exemption, claiming that it covered religious as well as secular positions. 26 But in papers filed with the courts the Church went further and claimed that the statutory exemption, and its alleged applicability to secular positions, was in fact required by the Free Exercise Clause. 27 In other words, the Church argued that depriving it of the right to engage in employment discrimination on the basis of religion, even in regard to employees performing secular functions, was a violation of its religious freedom. 28 As Justice Brennan put it, here was "a confrontation between the rights of religious organizations and those of individuals"-one of several constitutional conflicts involved in the case. 29 The Supreme Court agreed that the statutory exemption applied to the building custodian and that firing him for his religious beliefs was therefore lawful. 30 And while the Court refused to decide whether the exemption's applicability to secular positions was in fact 393, 415-16 (1922 And yet, as the lawyers for the fired custodian argued, the statutory exemption "offend[ed] equal protection principles by giving less protection to the employees of religious employers than to the employees of secular employers." 34 The exemption, they argued, violated the Equal Protection Clause. 35 The Supreme Court gave the claim short shrift: "To dispose of appellees' equal protection argument, it suffices to hold-as we now do-that . . . § 702 is rationally related to the legitimate purpose of alleviating significant governmental interference with the ability of religious organizations to define and carry out their religious missions." 36 Discrimination between religious and nonreligious individuals or organizations, if motivated by the desire to accommodate the free exercise of religion, deserves only the minimal rational basis review. 37 While this preference for Free Exercise over equal protection principles was uttered in the context of a statutory exemption (the Court explicitly refused to decide whether the exemption was 31. See id. at 339 n.17 ("We have no occasion to pass on the argument of the COP and the CPB that the exemption to which they are entitled under § 702 is required by the Free Exercise Clause.").
32. mandated by the Free Exercise Clause 38 ), it soon became clear that the preference may be equally applicable to constitutional conflicts. Thus federal courts have allowed religious institutions to avoid lawsuits claiming employment discrimination on the basis of ethnicity or age or disability unrelated to any religious creed, as long as the fired employee was a "minister" of a religious institution-a term whose contours remain exceedingly vague. 39 So while everybody agrees that the Catholic Church could not be sued for discriminating against women in hiring priests, the so-called "ministerial exception" goes further and holds that it could also not be sued for discriminating on the basis of disability, or race, or age that is unrelated to its religious creed.
The ministerial exception derived from both the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause, was upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court for the first time this year in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC. 40 The case involved the applicability of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") to a teacher in a religious school who spent almost all her time teaching secular subjects, but also performed some religious functions and was designated a commissioned minister of the Church. 41 The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the teacher's lawsuit, which alleged unlawful termination a violation of the ADA.
The decision (which arguably flew in the face of established precedent 42 ) placed a federal constitutional limitation on the powers 40. 132 S. Ct. 694, 702 (2012) ("Both Religion Clauses bar the government from interfering with the decision of a religious group to fire one of its ministers.").
41. Id. at 709. 42. In Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), the Supreme Court decided it was constitutional for Oregon to prohibit the use of peyote, a natural hallucinogen, in a Native American Church sacrament. The Court held that "laws of general applicability," which are not aimed at suppressing religion but instead have a different and legitimate purpose (like the law forbidding the use of hallucinogens), can be constitutionally applied to religious practices even if they substantially burden the exercise of religion. Id. at 878-82. Laws forbidding employment discrimination on the basis of race or age or disability are, of course, laws of general applicability. Chief Justice Roberts, the author of Hosanna-Tabor, distinguished antidiscrimination laws from laws criminalizing peyote by saying that the latter regulate an "outward physical act[]" rather than "an internal church decision that affects [its] faith and mission." Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 707. This is the sort of potentially empty and unexplained distinction that would earn a law student a bad grade.
of Congress and the states to expand antidiscrimination protections to religious employers. And while the requirements of the ADA are not themselves mandated by the Equal Protection Clause, they certainly reflect the concerns of this important civil protection, whose equivalents are found in many state constitutions. 43 and EEOC v. Hosanna-Tabor 44 also involved conflicts between the Establishment Clause and equal protection principles. Both the church in Amos and the church in Hosanna-Tabor claimed that their exemptions from antidiscrimination laws were also mandated by the Establishment Clause. 45 In Amos, the principal argument was that absent an exemption for religion-based discrimination that also applies to secular employees, courts would be forced to evaluate theological doctrine in deciding whether an employee's position is religious or secular. 46 Such inquiries, in turn, would constitute the sort of "excessive government entanglement with religion" that has long been recognized as a violation of the Establishment Clause. 47 The district court that first decided Amos rejected this Establishment Clause claim, 48 but the Supreme Court had a different take on the matter. 49 Although it refused to decide this specific issue, the Court did refer to the exemption's salutary effect on this Establishment Clause concern: "the statute," said the Court, "effectuates a more complete separation [ Id. The concurrence heartily agreed: "What makes the application of a religious-secular distinction difficult is that the character of an activity is not selfevident. As a result, determining whether an activity is religious or secular requires a searching case-by-case analysis. This results in considerable ongoing government entanglement in religious affairs." Id. at 343 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613, which articulated the Establishment Clause test forbidding "an [Vol. 64:2
Equal Protection Versus Establishment Clause Both Amos v. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop
The claim that the Establishment Clause prohibits the application of antidiscrimination principles to churches' employment relationships with their employees was explicitly adopted in Hosanna-Tabor, where the Supreme Court held that the Clause required the dismissal of all employment discrimination claims on the part of church "ministers." 51 In short, the Establishment Clause forbade the application of antidiscrimination statutes to religious organizations' employment decisions regarding so-called ministerial employees, and may further forbid the application of religion-based antidiscrimination statutes to secular employees. The Establishment Clause is therefore another bar to the ability of Congress or the states to expand antidiscrimination protections.
Free Exercise Versus Establishment Cause
The question for which the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Amos was "whether applying the § 702 exemption to the secular nonprofit activities of religious organizations violat[ed] the Establishment Clause." 52 But this Establishment Clause claim clashed directly with the Free Exercise Clause rights of the custodian, whose religious beliefs cost him his job. The Supreme Court rejected the custodian's Free Exercise argument by noting, in a footnote, that although the custodian's religious freedom was infringed by the church, it was not infringed by the statute because "his discharge was not required by statute." 53 Thus there was no state action involved in the firing and therefore no violation of the Free Exercise Clause. This is not the place for a critique of this peculiar take on the state action doctrine; 54 suffice it to say that this was a rather offhand dismissal of a serious constitutional concern.
Alleged conflicts between the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause arise most commonly in the context of laws singling out religious institutions for special treatment (not a rare statutory event), where the assertion that the special treatment is mandated by the Free Exercise Clause collides with the claim that excessive government entanglement with religion").
51. practice its beliefs." 64 But the danger of constitutional limitations on civil liberties derives not only from sound interpretations of the Federal Constitution but also (perhaps particularly) from bad onesas the next case also demonstrates.
Right to Assisted Suicide Versus Equal Protection
In 1994, Oregon voters proposed and approved the Death with Dignity Act, a citizens' initiated ballot measure that provided terminally ill patients a limited statutory right to be assisted by their physicians if they wish to hasten their death. 65 The Act was subjected to a barrage of legal challenges from the moment it passed. 66 One of these lawsuits, filed in federal district court, claimed that the Act was in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, Due Process Clause, Free Exercise Clause, and the freedom of association. 67 The federal judge who decided that case agreed that the Act violated the Equal Protection Clause. 68 According to that court, the violation consisted in discriminating against terminally ill patients by failing to provide them with the same legal protections against suicide enjoyed by everyone else. 69 The court cited laws criminalizing assisted suicide, 70 laws providing that a person may use reasonable physical force to thwart a suicide attempt, 71 and laws authorizing the Board of Medical Examiners to take disciplinary action against a physician for conduct endangering the health of a patient. 72 The court also found constitutional fault with the absence of a requirement of an expert determination that a terminally ill patient was competent (above and beyond the determination of the attending physician), 73 as well as the statute's grant of immunity from criminal and civil liability for physicians acting in good faith under the Act. 74 80 Colorado responded by claiming that the Amendment safeguarded the civil liberties of its citizens: "The primary rationale . . . for Amendment 2 is respect for other citizens' freedom of association, and in particular the liberties of landlords or employers who have personal or religious objections to homosexuality." 81 The Supreme Court rejected that claim by denying its veracity: "The breadth of the amendment," said the Court, "is so far removed from these particular justifications that we find it impossible to credit them." 82 Instead, the Amendment was actually motivated by "a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group" and was therefore unconstitutional. 83 The alleged conflict between the Equal Protection Clause and religious freedom was thus read out of the case. 84 But avoiding the issue is becoming more and more difficult. As homosexuals' struggle for recognition and equality becomes more successful-from the recent abolition of the military's "don't-askdon't-tell" policy 85 to the partially successful struggle for same-sex marriage 86 infringements of their own civil liberties. One such argument is that forcing religious organizations or individuals in their capacities as professionals, employers, landlords, or even government officials, to accord recognition to the marital status of gay couples is a violation of the Free Exercise Clause. 87 In 2008, the California Supreme Court held that making it unlawful for a fertility doctor to discriminate against a lesbian woman despite his religious beliefs, did not violate the Federal Free Exercise Clause. 88 But such claims persist. In New York, a similar claim of religious freedom was made by a government official: In September 2011, the New York Times reported of an elected county clerk in an upstate New York community who refused to sign samesex marriage licenses because these were against her religious beliefs. 89 These alleged constitutional conflicts will sooner or later have to be resolved-hopefully in the same manner in which they were resolved in the context of racial discrimination. After all, the claim that discriminatory conduct is constitutionally protected by the Free Exercise right has been heard before. 90 
Right of Expressive Association Versus Equal Protection
Opponents of homosexuals' equality also claim the benefit of the First Amendment's right of association. 91 In 2000, the United States Supreme Court decided the case of James Dale, an assistant scoutmaster in the Boy Scouts of America who was expelled from the organization once it was learned he was a homosexual. 92 Dale sued the Boy Scouts for unlawful discrimination, and the Supreme Court of New Jersey agreed with his claim, finding that the organization violated New Jersey's antidiscrimination statutes. 93 In reaching that conclusion, the New Jersey court rejected the argument that New Jersey's antidiscrimination laws violated the Boy Scouts' First Amendment right of "expressive association"-which protects some membership choices of associations engaged in 87 "expressive activities" (a broadly-read category). 94 The court first determined that the State's interest in antidiscrimination policies was "compelling," and that "[t]he right of expressive association must, therefore, be weighed against this compelling interest." 95 The court then compared the respective interests involved (the interest in protecting people from unlawful discrimination, and the interest of expressive associations in control over their membership), and concluded that applying New Jersey's antidiscrimination laws to the Boy Scouts of America did not violate the right of expressive association. 96 The United States Supreme Court reversed. 97 The Court first determined that the Boy Scouts' expressive message included disapproval of homosexuality, and that Dale's membership in the organization would therefore significantly burden the organization. 98 Turning its gaze to the New Jersey statute, the Court then tersely pronounced that "[t]he state interests embodied in New Jersey's [antidiscrimination] law do not justify such a severe intrusion on the Boy Scouts' rights to freedom of expressive association." 99 This was a rather quick dismissal of the important interest in fighting discrimination. True, Dale's antidiscrimination right did not derive from the Federal Constitution: since the Boy Scouts of America is a nongovernmental organization, it is not bound by the Federal Equal Protection Clause. 100 But a number of state constitutions have no state action requirement attached to their equal protection guarantee; 101 and at any event, the right to be free from discrimination based on sexual orientation is clearly a concern of the Federal Constitution as well. 102 103 The prosecution received lots of attention by the media, and it was that media coverage that stood at the center of the appeal to the Supreme Court. 104 Describing the trial as a "carnival" and "a 'Roman holiday' for the news media," the Supreme Court reversed Sheppard's conviction. 105 These were no overstatements. At one point, "[w]hen Sheppard's chief counsel attempted to place some documents in the record [during the coroner's inquest], he was forcibly ejected from the room by the Coroner, who received cheers, hugs, and kisses from ladies in the audience." 106 Contributing to the histrionics was a "swarm of reporters and photographers" who were given express permission to photograph the twelve jurors-whose photographs appeared prominently in the press while the trial was in progress. 107 The Supreme Court found that the judge's failure to control the publicity surrounding the trial violated the Due Process Clause's guarantee of a fair trial. 108 The Court recognized that "[t]he press does not simply publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism," 109 and also that "'the framers . . . intended to give to liberty of the press . . . the broadest scope that could be countenanced in an orderly society.'" 110 Nevertheless, the freedom of speech and of the press, said the Court, must give way in cases where there is a "threat or menace to the integrity of the trial." 111 Sheppard thus pitted the constitutional right to a fair trial against the freedom of speech and ruled for the former. But while that preference may have been justified in Sheppard, the case gave rise to more problematic applications: there have been growing concerns over the proliferation of gag orders issued to lawyers in highly publicized trials, both criminal and civil, in reliance on Sheppard and the constitutional right to a fair trial. 112 Proponents of lawyers' speech argue that zealous and effective representation often requires that lawyers speak to the press. 113 They point to the possible impact of negative media coverage on judges and juries, to the fact that such speech may help lawyers gather evidence by addressing the public, that it may cause all involved to go carefully about their jobs, and also that it may protect clients' reputations. 114 The prohibitions on lawyers' statements, they claim, constitute content-based restrictions on political speech in violation of the First Amendment. 115 But their claims have been rejected by a number of courts. This constitutional conflict between free speech rights and the right to a fair trial has produced a split among federal courts, but the Supreme Court has so far refused to weigh in. 116 
Right to Privacy Versus Right to Life
In Roe v. Wade, appellants challenged Texas' criminal abortion statute as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. 117 In response, Texas argued, inter alia, that the statute was constitutional because "the fetus is a 'person' within the language and meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment," 118 and is therefore protected by the Amendment's guarantee against deprivation "of life . . . without due process of law." 119 And since the constitutional right to life was of higher value than the right to liberty (which protected most pregnant women), any conflict between the two had to be resolved in favor of the fetus. 120 The U.S. Supreme Court rejected the claim after concluding that the term "person" in the Constitution did not mean to include "the unborn." 121 Indeed, the claim that prenatal life qualified as a "person" under the Fourteenth Amendment was not accepted even by the Justices most opposed to the constitutional right to abort, who thought that the Federal Constitution did not protect that right-but not that it forbade it (which would have been one implication of recognizing fetuses as constitutional protected persons). 122 For those who regard fetuses as proper depositories of civil liberties, Roe is another example of a federal constitutional limitation on states' abilities to expand civil rights. Conversely, recognition of prenatal constitutional rights would have imposed formidable limitations on women's right to abort. 123 This is precisely what happened in Germany when the German Constitutional Court invalidated a statute making abortions legal during the first three months of pregnancy. 124 The German court recognized a constitutional conflict between women's right to autonomy and the right to life of the fetus under a provision of Germany's "Basic Law" (its constitution) that protects every person's "right to life and physical integrity." 125 And then, evaluating the two against each other, the court concluded that the right to life should be given priority because its deprivation was final. 126 123. It is worth remembering that Roe v. Wade did allow the government to ban abortions altogether after viability unless an abortion is necessary for the life or health of the mother. 410 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1973) . In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876 (1992), the Supreme Court went further and recognized a "substantial state interest in potential life throughout pregnancy." And while the phrase "potential life," Casey, 505 U.S. at 876, suggests a concern grounded in what may become a human being, rather than a concern with the inherent worth of prenatal life itself, a recent Supreme Court decision suggests otherwise. In Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007), the Court claimed that the interest in protecting "potential life" supported a ban on so-called "partial-birth" abortions even though alternative procedures could be used to abort these very fetuses. 126. Jonas & Gorby, supra note 124, at 643 ("According to the principle of the balance which preserves most of competing constitutionally protected positions in view of the fundamental idea of Article 19, Paragraph 2, of the Basic Law; precedence must be given to the protection of the life of the child about to be born. This precedence exists as a matter of principle for the entire duration of pregnancy and may not be placed in question for any particular time.") (citation omitted). the statute and ordered the West German state to make abortion unlawful. 127 The United States has a large constituency pining for a similar constitutional ruling.
There are persistent attempts to enact statutory and constitutional provisions that endow fetuses with civil rights-like the recent Colorado and Alabama ballot measures that would have granted fertilized human eggs a "personhood" status under these states' constitutions. 128 And despite the Supreme Court's clear decision to the contrary, the claim that fetuses enjoy a right to life under the Federal Constitution regularly recurs in American courts. 129 
B. Conflicts Within Rights
Some conflicts of rights can arise within one and the same constitutional provision.
Free Exercise
Recall Justice Stewart's claim that bible reading in public schools constitutes a conflict between different holders of Free Exercise rights: the right of parents wishing to have their children religiously instructed in public schools and the right of parents who object to such instruction. 130 Another alleged Free Exercise conflict was at play in Amos, 131 where the Mormon Church claimed the constitutional right to engage in employment discrimination on the basis of religion in regard to secular positions. 132 As discussed above, the Supreme Court agreed with the Church on statutory grounds while declining to decide whether that result was also mandated by the Free Exercise Clause. 133 However, as the district court that first decided the case had pointed out, the Free Exercise right most burdened in the case was, of course, the right of the fired custodian, whose religious beliefs cost him his job: "Abolition of the [statutory] exclusion for non-religious, secular activities," wrote that court, "enhances rather than violates the free exercise clause; it keeps religious institutions from being permitted to burden the free exercise rights of nonmembers who seek employment in non-religious jobs." 134 As we saw, the Supreme Court summarily rejected the Free Exercise claim of the fired employee. 135
Establishment Clause
Amos also presented a conflict between different Establishment Clause claims. According to the federal district court, the statutory exemption violated the Establishment Clause because it amounted to an advancement of religion. 136 But the Church claimed that the Establishment Clause mandated the statutory exemption because its absence would have entailed an excessive entanglement between church and state. 137 The Supreme Court rejected the former claim while declining to decide the latter. 138 But its analysis pointed to the possibility that some Establishment Clause doctrines may place a limit on the applicability of other Establishment Clause precedents.
Free Speech
Another conflict between litigants relying on the same constitutional provision came up in Pruneyard, discussed above, where a shopping mall owner challenged applicability of the California Constitution's free speech provision to privately owned shopping malls. 139 In addition to the Takings Clause claim examined above, 140 the owner also argued that forbidding him to exclude political protestors from his private property amounted to compelled speech in violation of the First Amendment. 141 The claim was based on Supreme Court cases holding that the right to free speech encompassed the right not to speak-including a 1977 precedent, Wooley v. Maynard (1977) 146 These school districts sought to remedy the emergence, or reemergence, of racially homogenous schools-an alarming phenomenon and a threat to the ideal of equal opportunity. The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, found that the use of race-based admission decisions violated the equal protection rights of white children who were denied the schools of their choice because of their race. 147 And yet equal protection interests were also on the side of the minority children who benefited from the programs. In actual fact, it was not long ago that the Equal Protection Clause was thought to positively require such integration efforts! After all, Brown v. Board of Education declared that "[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently unequal"; 148 and while that statement was made in the context of state laws that mandated racial separation, the Equal Protection Clause required active integrative efforts even after segregation ceased to be officially mandated or even implicitly attempted. 149 Thus, in Board of Education v. Dowell, 150 the Supreme Court conditioned the dissolving of a desegregation decree on "compliance with it for a reasonable period of time" 151 and a finding that "the vestiges of past discrimination had been eliminated to the Id. at 211-12 ("The respondent School Board invoked at trial its 'neighborhood school policy' as explaining racial and ethnic concentrations within the core city schools, arguing that since the core city area population had long been Negro and Hispano, the concentrations were necessarily the result of residential patterns and not of purposefully segregative policies. We have no occasion to consider in this case whether a 'neighborhood school policy' of itself will justify racial or ethnic concentrations in the absence of a finding that school authorities have committed acts constituting de jure segregation. It is enough that we hold that the mere assertion of such a policy is not dispositive . . . ."). See also id. at 219-20 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("In my view we should abandon . . . . the distinction between de jure and de facto segregation."); id. at 214-5 (Douglas, J., concurring) ("I agree with my Brother Powell that there is, for the purposes of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as applied to the school cases, no difference between de facto and de jure segregation.").
155. Crawford v. Bd. of Educ., 551 P.2d 28, 34 (Cal. 1976) ("[I]n this state school boards do bear a constitutional obligation to take reasonable steps to alleviate segregation in the public schools, whether the segregation be de facto or de jure in origin."). controversy. Some find it "inappropriate . . . in a free and democratic society[,]" 158 while others see it as an essential guarantor of democracy-a counter-majoritarian measure that protects the rights that guarantee democracy and the rights produced by the democratic process. 159 But whatever one thinks about the relationship between judicial review and democracy, that relationship gets much trickier when judicial review limits civil liberties. And so it is only fitting to ask whether conflicts between civil rights call for some specialized methodology of judicial review: do we need a specially crafted constitutional doctrine or judicial philosophy for resolving conflicts among civil rights? Such a proposal appeared in recent European literature on the subject. 160 The issue of conflicts of rights seems to loom larger on the Continent, perhaps because of greater concerns over the sovereignty of European Union member states, and the relatively recent vintage and expanding scope of European human rights norms. Accordingly, some scholars began calling attention to the issue and have offered critical evaluations of the European Court of Human Rights' "balancing" approach for resolving conflicts of rights. 161 The most critical of these European commentaries relied on Isaiah Berlin's celebrated thesis of the "incommensurability of fundamental values" to launch a radical critique of judicial resolutions of conflicts of rights. 162 Isiah Berlin has famously argued that "human goals are many, not all of them commensurable, and in perpetual rivalry with one another." 163 "To assume that all values can be graded on one scale," said Berlin, "seems to me to falsify our knowledge . . . . In the end, men choose between ultimate values." 164 He concluded that "the possibility of conflict-and of tragedy [in resolving conflicts between ultimate values]-can never wholly be eliminated." 165 Thus, what makes conflicts between values like equality or liberty "tragic" is the inability to resolve them by simply opting for the smaller loss: there can be no "smaller loss" since there is no common measure between them. And this presumably means that no resolution can be more justified than its alternative. 166 Accordingly, said Berlin, the resolution of conflicts among fundamental values cannot be the subject of "rational choice" and is ultimately "without possibility of rational arbitration." 167 Some scholars argue that Berlin's thesis carries directly to the resolution of conflicts among fundamental constitutional rights: resolving such conflicts, they say, is at bottom not a rational decision but is little more than a naked value preference. 168 This claim implies that resolving conflicts among civil rights may be the proper business of democratic politics rather than courts. At the very least, such a view suggests that courts should defer to legislatures (or perhaps to state courts interpreting their own constitutions) when they encounter such conflicts; or that they should exercise some form of judicial minimalism, by resolving such disputes without settling issues of principle or value but instead grounding their decisions in shallow reasoning that explains little but allows maximum future flexibility. 169 Yet the claim that conflicts among constitutional rights are "without possibility of rational arbitration" 170 seems to me utterly 165 Legal reasoning, I suggest, is not capable of producing a single right answer in these cases; more importantly, these cases cannot be resolved rationally."). For an attack on the rationality of legal resolutions writ large, including conflicts of rights, see PIERRE SCHLAG, THE ENCHANTMENT OF REASON 32 (1998) ("It can, of course, seem outrageous to suggest that the relative standing of the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause is no more susceptible to reasoned analysis than a choice between vanilla ice cream and strawberry ice cream. . . . [But] the fact is that for all the ethical and political thought heaped on the constitutional question as opposed to the ice cream question, for all the doctrinal complexity that mediates legal conflicts as opposed to ice cream choices, the former is no more tractable or susceptible to rational resolution than the latter. In the end, . . . we are left talking about preferences for freedom of speech as opposed to preferences for equality.").
169. Even when genuine conflicts among constitutional rights actually arise, rational deliberation has much to say on their proper resolution. Consider, once again, the PruneYard 171 decision (where a shopping mall owner challenged a California constitutional decision forcing him to accommodate political protestors), which involved a conflict between the two fundamental constitutional liberties of free speech and private property. 172 This conflict may threaten to produce the "tragic" scenario contemplated by Berlin-where prioritizing free speech rights over private property rights would be no more justified than the reverse. 173 But once we consider the factual circumstances in the case, what may have been-in the abstract-a potentially irredeemable clash of values becomes far less difficult. After all, the principal consideration in the case was the owner's own opening of his property to the general public-indeed, his encouragement to the public to enter it. 174 The burden of which the owner complained was brought about by his own voluntary conversion of his private property into public use. 175 This important fact was decisive for the courts' resolution of the case. 176 When we take our deliberations away from abstract philosophical ruminations and into concrete interests and concrete constitutional guarantees, denying the "possibility of rational arbitration" becomes far less plausible. 177 Perhaps we could retain something of Berlin's insight-like the understanding that in such conflicts something valuable must give, and that conflicts of rights are tragic in that they require that we turn away from something we cherish and respect. But these recognitions are a far cry from denying the rationality of settling such constitutional disputes.
Ronald Dworkin has criticized Berlin's incommensurability thesis on related grounds. 178 Dworkin-whose "right answer thesis" naturally leads to a position incompatible with Berlin's-has long claimed that our values may be reconcilable in a grand edifice of coherent and mutually accommodating moral and political principles. 179 This idea has been described as "value monism," in contradistinction to Berlin's value pluralism. 180 Dworkin, who edited a book on Berlin's philosophy and penned one of its chapters, begins by pointing out the ambitious nature of Berlin's thesis. 181 Berlin-says Dworkin-has argued that "the ideal of harmony [among fundamental values] is not just unobtainable but 'incoherent' because securing or protecting one value necessarily involves abandoning or compromising another." 182 The "idea . . . that a conflict in important values involves some genuine and important damage . . . is central to Berlin's idea." 183 Whenever we have conflicts of fundamental values we "must choose, that is, not whether to wrong some group, but which group to wrong." 184 According to Dworkin, Berlin fails to realize that what we mean by values like liberty or equality includes the various ways with which these values qualify and limit each other. 185 Thus, forbidding people to smash each other's heads is not some tragic compromise or partial abandonment of the value of liberty, because we do not understand that value to include the freedom to kill. 186 And similarly, when we limit the liberty of people to rent or sell their property on a racially discriminatory basis, that limitation is best seen not as an injury to liberty but as a more refined understanding of what liberty is. 187 In other words, when we speak of equality or of liberty we do not speak of some Platonic ideals but of contextualized values shaped by real-life concerns, including the demands and requirements of other values. 188 The resolution of conflicts among values depends, to a large extent, on how we understand those values in light of each other, and such understanding requires lots of rational footwork.
The same holds, a fortiori, to conflicts among legally protected civil rights. When we resolve such conflicts, we refine the content of those legal rights and liberties in light of each other. We do not simply pick winners or losers but decide how our civil liberties should hang together in light of the various purposes they serve, the actual interests at stake, and the particular burdens imposed by the challenged action. These decisions are not much different than resolving any other legal dispute.
IV. CONCLUSION
If resolving a conflict between civil rights is as rational an undertaking as resolving any other constitutional case, then the legitimacy of these judicial decisions may be no different than the legitimacy of any other form of judicial review. And yet, there should be no doubt that conflicts of rights present particularly delicate and difficult cases, because such cases not only protect civil liberties but may also curtail them.
Unfortunately, as we saw, many of the opinions dealing with such potential conflicts seem more interested in sweeping them under the rug than in engaging with their difficult and often controversial issues. Such evasions undermine the rationality of these resolutions and with it their legitimacy. Moreover these evasions are particularly deplorable given the inevitable value judgments that are often involved in such constitutional decisions. We must not forget that conflicts among civil liberties implicate deep and well known ideological divides: American conservatives and liberals are famously divided over the different importance they accord to different civil liberties-from property rights, to equality rights, to rights of association, to individual autonomy, to gun rights. All these have their predictable supporters and detractors. And so liberals and conservatives may be inclined to give starkly different solutions to conflicts among civil rights. And this means that judicial interpretations of the Federal Constitution, if unduly ideological, may not only limit the ability of legislatures or state courts to expand civil liberties but may also do so in a way that privileges an entire vision of civil liberties while suppressing another.
This point brings us back to the characterization of the Roberts Court as "the most conservative court since the mid-1930s." 189 As discussed above, the Roberts Court has already encountered some conflicts of rights, and is likely to encounter more. 190 
